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Abstract
This paper uses a fundamental Q model of investment to consider the role played
by nancing frictions in agricultural investment decisions, controlling econometrically for
censoring, heterogeneity and errors-in-variables. Our ndings suggest that farmer's in-
vestment decisions are not driven by market fundamentals. We nd some evidence that
debt overhang restricts investment but investment is not dependent on liquidity or internal
funds. The role of nancing frictions in determining investment decisions changes in the
post-nancial crisis period when debt overhang becomes a signicant impediment to farm
investment. The evidence suggests that farmers increasingly rely on internal liquidity to
drive investment. Finally, we nd no evidence that farmers use o-farm capital to fund
on-farm investment.
Keywords: Credit Constraints, Firm Level Investment, Tobin's Q, Debt
JEL classication: G31, G32, F34
11 Introduction and background
Investment is of critical importance to economic development, driving productivity and e-
ciency in production and enhancing rm protability. Given this important role, there has
been signicant research into the determinants of investment expenditure by rms and the
factors that inuence their investment behaviour. This papers' contribution is twofold. First,
building on research concerning investment in European agriculture (Huettel et al. (2010),
Sckokai and Moro (2009), Vercammen (2007)), this paper uses Q theory (Tobin and Brainard
(1976)) to evaluate the role played by fundamentals and nancing frictions in determining on-
farm investment. Second, the paper contributes to the methodology appropriate for analysing
lumpy investment decisions by simultaneously addressing issues of censoring, heterogeneity
and errors-in-variables in panel data.
This research specically looks at the contrasting role played by expectations about future
protability, and nancial considerations namely debt overhang, liquidity and o-farm income
in driving on-farm investment behaviour. It also considers the impact of changes in the
credit operating environment on investment behaviour. A number of structural changes have
occurred to nancial and capital markets and the credit environment in Europe in the last
number of years, namely the introduction of the euro as well as the recent nancial crisis.
This paper considers the eect of these major changes to the operating environment on access
to credit for on-farm investment.
Using farm level data from Ireland over the period 1996-2009, a fundamental Q model of
investment is estimated with nancing frictions included in the empirical investment equation.
To estimate values for Q, the GMM panel vector autoregression (VAR) approach outlined in
Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) is used. This method has been extended to consider issues
of investment in agriculture by Bierlen and Featherstone (1998) and Benjamin and Phimister
(2002).
The second contribution relates to the methodological approach as a number of econo-
metric challenges are addressed in this paper. The nature of the data, as well as the research
question under review raises three econometric issues, namely censoring of the dependent in-
vestment variable, mis-measurement in the estimate of Q and unobserved heterogeneity that
arises in a normal micro-data situation. We use an instrumental variables xed eects model
with the Symmetrically Censored Least Squares (SCLS) approach of Powell (1986) and Chay
2and Powell (2001) to cater for censoring, individual heterogeneity and errors-in-variables.
A number of important conclusions emerge from our research. Firstly, the results indicate
that fundamentals do not appear to drive investment activity. While the coecient for Q is
not signicant in the majority of regressions, the actual sign on the coecient is negative; the
opposite to a-priori expectations. This is dicult to interpret. One explanation may be that
some farmers, observing declining fundamentals, are attempting to invest to turn the position
around instead of exiting the market or consolidating. Choosing to remain active in farming
may be motivated by non-economic reasons such as lifestyle, tradition or other social factors.
Considering the impact of nancing frictions on investment, there is some evidence that
debt overhang negatively impacts on investment. This eect is greatest for middle-aged
farmers. Over the whole sample, we nd no impact of liquidity on investment thus are
not dependent on internal funds This is not a surprising nding for two reasons. Firstly,
most farmers have a high net worth due to the large land holdings they own. These land
holdings are a signicant source of collateral which can be used in accessing credit from
nancial institutions. Our nding in terms of liquidity would corroborate the fact that,
due to the high net worth, farmers are not constrained by current income or liquidity in
accessing investment credit. Additionally, the period in which our data covers in Ireland is
one of signicant increases in the value of land which provided an additional boost to farmers'
collateral. The second issue relates to the security of income from farming in the EU. The
signicant level of subsidisation in both pre and post decoupling environments provides income
streams of relatively low risk and volatility. The security of income would reduce the risk and
provide farmers with better access to debt nancing. This result corroborates the ndings of
Vercammen (2007) who posits that direct payments may stimulate investment by reducing
the risk of bankruptcy and increasing the expected value of marginal investment. This result
is also highlighted in Sckokai and Moro (2009).
In terms of the role played by o-farm income on investment, we nd no evidence of a
direct impact whereby it supplements internal funds used for investment purposes. There is
also no evidence found in regard to the indirect channel whereby o-farm employment eases
credit constraints by inuencing the decision of lenders to take o-farm employment into
account when making loan decisions.
Finally, the impact of the credit cycle on nancing frictions is investigated. Our ndings
3indicate that in the pre-crisis period, following Ireland adopting the euro currency, credit
constraints did not bind and neither did debt overhang or liquidity impact on investment.
This was a period in which credit was abundant in the overall economy, as Irish banks accessed
international and euro credit markets with relative ease. It is no surprise that farmers, who
have access to signicant collateral due to their land holdings, were not credit constrained.
However, since the onset of the nancial crisis, both debt overhang and liquidity have become
signicant determinants of investment. Debt overhang is found to have a signicant and
negative impact on investment following the crisis while liquidity is found to have a positive
impact on investment since the crisis. This indicates that farmers are now dependent on their
internal funds to drive investment.
2 Measuring Q and the empirical investment equation
Central to the estimation of Q theory models of investment is the choice of empirical proxy for
the theoretical marginal Q. In this paper, the approach outlined by Gilchrist and Himmelberg
(1995), and applied in an agricultural micro-data context by Benjamin and Phimister (2002)
and Bierlen and Featherstone (1998), is used to estimate Q from rm level fundamentals.
This approach allows the estimation of a Q statistic for enterprises with no nancial market
listings and is therefore a very important tool for considering the role of fundamentals in farm
level investment decisions. The forcing process for rm fundamentals is specied as an AR(1)
stochastic vector process. The vector includes rm level fundamentals which relate to the
protability of the organisation. The panel VAR is outlined as follows:






In regard to which of the rm level fundamentals are included in the model, dierent
authors have used varying combinations of fundamentals in this system. Beirlen and Feath-
erstone (1998) and Benjamin and Phimister (2002) include the marginal value product of
capital (mvpk) and total sales in their system VAR, xit. We include the mvpk 1 and the
1Following as Bierlen and Featherstone (1998) we have dened mvpk as gross output minus total costs
divided by the capital stock which basically provides a measure of the return per unit capital stock
4sales to capital ratio. The estimation procedure for the panel VAR uses the GMM approach
outlined in Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988) and Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995).
In this paper, our focus is on estimating the impact of nancing frictions on investment.
The structural model developing the Q approach relies on the assumption of perfect capital
markets (Hayashi, 1983) which implies that, when evaluating the protability of investment
decisions, rm managers are not constrained by issues relating to access to capital. Empiri-
cally this means that when an investment equation includes a good proxy for Q, no additional
variables should be signicant, including nancials, if the model's assumptions are correct.
For many rms especially SME's, assuming perfect capital markets is not realistic as they
face issues relating to asymmetric information in credit markets. This results in current levels
of leverage, the availability of collateral and the availability of internal funds impacting on
investment choices. We include three specic nancing frictions in the empirical investment
equation; the level of debt overhang, a measure of liquidity, and an o farm income indicator.
Our empirical specication is outlined as follows:
Iit
Ki;t 1
= 0 + 1qit  2Xit + ci + t + it (3)
where Xit is a vector of debt overhang, o farm income, liquidity, interactions of these and
general controls.
3 Data and Econometric Methodology
This section presents the data and outlines the econometric approach used to deal with each
of the aforementioned issues.
3.1 Data
The data used in this paper are taken from the Irish National Farm Survey. The total sample
contains some 15,700 observations. The main variables in the model relate to investment
and nancing frictions. For the dependent variable on business investment, the farm survey
has annual values for net new on-farm investment. In terms of Irish agriculture, investment
was reasonably static over the period 1996-2006, a signicant investment spike occurred in
the period 2007 - 2008. This coincided with the signicant government incentives that were
5oered during this time.
3.2 Sample Selection
A signicant issue that arises with investment data is the occurrence of zero observations
on the dependent variable. Many investment programmes, especially for farms, are lumpy
and infrequent. These type of data also contain negative observations on rms that are
divesting and potentially leaving the industry. These considerations raise concerns about
sample selection and present challenges to standard estimation techniques.
This paper uses a methodology drawing on the work of Jones and Labeaga (2002) to treat
the issue of repeated zero observations and censoring. The sample is split into those farms that
never invest and those that are potential investors. Non-investors are dened as those farms
that post a zero investment level in all years in the sample. Potential investors may or may
not have positive investment in year t but must have made at least one positive investment
in the sample period. Splitting the sample along these lines is particularly important in the
agriculture sector due to the existence of hobby and part-time farmers. These individuals
may not respond to market incentives and are active in the industry due to non-economic,
social or historical reasons. Removing the non-investors potentially induces sample selection
bias. Following Jones and Labeaga (2002) and Wooldridge (1995), we use an inverse mills
ratio (IMR) test for sample selection bias.
3.3 Censoring
An innovation of this paper is applying sample selection techniques so as to appropriately treat
the behaviour of investors and exclude those that are not investors from the sample. Having
excluded non-investors, the remaining zero observations must be controlled for. The intuition
behind using a censoring technique comes from the latent style behaviour of investment. The
observed outcomes are realisations of unobservable preferences of investors. These underlying
preferences may actually indicate a negative view towards investment but the only observed
values are positive or zero. This view should related to the information contained in current
market fundamentals. The Q model assumes that these fundamentals provide the signals to
farmers regarding investment choices. It is important to pick up this latent behaviour using a
censoring technique. Methods for dealing with censoring, such as the tobit and double-hurdle
6models, have become standard in the literature Keelan et al. (2008). However, both methods
require strong distributional assumptions (for example, homoscedasticity and normality of
the errors) which will lead to inconsistent estimates if violated. Furthermore, when using
panel data unobserved heterogeneity across units cannot be controlled for using xed eects
due to the incidental parameters problem. In this paper, we avoid these issues by using
the Symmetrically Censored Least Squares (SCLS) approach of Powell (1986) and Chay and
Powell (2001). This approach assumes that the latent dependent variable is symmetrically
distributed around the regression function. Given that the observed dependent variable will
have an asymmetric distribution symmetry is restored by symmetrically trimming the upper
tail of the distribution of the dependent variable to correspond with the censoring at zero.
With this transformation least squares estimation procedures, incorporating xed eects, are
valid.
3.4 Errors-in-variables and heterogeneity
Our GMM proxy for Q is subject to measurement error due to the fact that an estimate of
the present discounted value of the rm is replaced by an estimate using the fundamental
VAR. To obtain a consistent estimate of this model, the problem of errors-in-variables must be
treated correctly. In addition, as individual heterogeneity is present in this panel data setting,
a xed eects transformation is required to ensure consistent estimates. Fixed eects within
group transformations are not valid in this setting as this would require a strong exogeneity
assumption along the lines of E [uit=ci;xi1;::;xi1;:::;xiT]. This would invalidate the use of
lags as instruments. Therefore, in line with Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), a rst dierence
approach is used to control for heterogeneity. The weak exogeneity condition that provides
a basis for the selection of instruments using this methodology is E(4uitxi;t s) = 08s > 1.
Given these assumptions all available years data in levels for the independent variables, the
other than the rst lag, are valid instruments.
4 Empirical Results
The model is estimated using OLS and instrumental variables (IV) methods with robust
standard errors and SCLS methods with boostrap standard errors. The investment equation
7is estimated with dierent combinations of fundamental Q and the nancing frictions: debt
overhang; internal funds; o-farm income; and interactions. Time, age, size and investment
grant controls are included in all regressions.
Prior to presenting the main results, some important econometric tests are completed.
The sample selection test outlined in section 4 is conducted to evaluate the impact of the
restrictions imposed on the exclusion of observations. The results indicate a t-statistic on
the IMR of  1:16, and a p-value of 0.246. This value indicates that there is no problem of
sample selection and we can proceed with the sample excluding the non-investors. The third
lag level of the mvpk was selected for use as the appropriate instrument.
4.1 Fundamentals and debt overhang
The empirical model was estimated with Q alone using both the IV and SCLS methods. Using
OLS and IV techniques, the results indicate a negative relationship between Q and investment.
It is signicant at the 90 percent level. The impact of using the IV approach to treat the
measurement error can be seen in the fact that the impact on Q increased from -0.15 to -0.93
when we move from the OLS to IV methods. The negative sign on Q is a nding that runs
counter to the neoclassical theoretical framework and our a-priori expectations. One possible
explanation is that farm operators observe the declining protability and shrinking size of the
agricultural sector in Ireland. This is represented by declining fundamentals. Despite this
environment, farmers are disinclined to exit this industry and sell their farm holding. This
choice may be driven by non-economic factors. They therefore see investing as a method of
potentially reversing this decline i.e. their hope is that investing now may turn around poor
protability in the future. However, when we use the SCLS approach, fundamentals appear
not to have a signicant impact on investment but Q still retains its negative sign.
Debt overhang is found to be negatively related to investment and signicant at the 90
percent level using the IV method. This would indicate that having outstanding debts coming
into the period has a signicant and negative impact on current year investment activities
for farmers. However this eect becomes insignicant when we use the SCLS approach.
Additional data is available on the term structure of debt from the NFS. This data does not
equate fully to the total debt overhang used previously as it comes from additional survey
questions but it is accurate and representative. Using both the SCLS and IV methods, medium
8to long and short term debt are both signicant, the IV at the 99 percent level and SCLS
at the 95 percent level. It can be seen that it is actually short-term debt that has a larger
impact, as measured by the size of the coecient. This is an interesting nding and could
reect the fact that poor short term debt management such as an over reliance on overdraft
facilities and other short term facilities could be an indicator of poor credit worthiness of
the borrower. This evidence indicates that leverage plays a negative role in the decisions of
farmers looking to invest on the farm. However the variable is insignicant for total debt
overhang using the SCLS approach.
It is interesting to split the sample up to ascertain whether certain types of farm operations
are more or less impacted by the availability of credit. Two important characteristics of farms
controlled for in the previous table, are the age of the farm operator and the size of the
economically active farm area. Interacting the age and size eects with debt overhang, we
attempt to establish whether the impact of leverage is greater for certain size farms or certain
age farmers.
Debt overhang has a negative impact on farmers in the mid range age. Leverage is not
an impediment to investment for young farmers or old farmers. One might expect banks to
be less likely to extend credit to older farmers given their closeness to retirement and ceasing
economic activity in which case the result for older farmers is contrary to expectations. It is
more likely however that the impact is on the demand side in the context that older farmers
are not investing actively therefore do not demand credit to nance investment resulting in
an insignicant eect. The behaviour of older farmers may also be inuenced by the existence
of a successor. If a successor is present, the nancial institution may take this into account
when making lending decisions and age therefore may not restrict access to capital. In regard
to whether the size of the farm impacts on whether debt overhang restricts investment, one
would expect larger farms with more collateral to be in a position to take on considerably
more debt. Our results however indicate no signicant impact of the size of the farm on the
role of debt overhang in investment nancing.
In general, these results point to a negative impact of debt overhang on investment but
the result does not hold for all the models tested. It must be noted that the period in which
we are considering was one of signicant credit availability in the wider economy in Ireland
and it is unlikely that farmers, within the wider credit operating environment, would have
9had diculty raising capital regardless of initial leverage levels. Having signicant levels of
collateral in the form of land holdings, coupled with the widespread availability of capital in
the economy, may explain why a stronger impact of debt on investment is not found here. The
subsidies paid to farmers with the EU Common Agricultural Policy scheme would also have
provided farmers with a relatively secure and predictable income stream. Credit providers
may have seen lending on this back of this payment structure was relatively low risk.
4.2 Fundamentals and liquidity
The second nancial consideration relates to the role of liquidity or internal funds on invest-
ment. To evaluate this impact we include the ratio of interest to current income. This ratio
captures the ability of the rm to cover its short term obligations with its short term assets.
We include income in the denominator of this metric, to avoid missing observations where
interest payments are zero. As such, if farms are reliant on internal funds to drive investment,
we would expect a negative relationship between this ratio and investment. The sample size
for the models including this variable falls slightly due to missing observations. Full regression
results are included in the longer paper version.
We nd no signicant impact of fundamentals on investment in these models. Using the
IV and SCLS approaches, the results indicate that, while carrying the correct sign, there is
no role for liquidity in driving on-farm investment. This indicates that farmers are not reliant
on internal funds to drive investment over the whole sample. Some evidence is found for a
liquidity impact using the OLS method but these estimates are inconsistent.
We also interact liquidity and both the age and size cohort eects. Using the more ecient
SCLS approach, it appears that neither the age of the farm operator or the size of the farm
play a role in determining whether liquidity impacts on investment behaviour, thus reinforcing
the ndings for the whole sample.
As was noted above in regard to impact of the wider credit operating environment on
debt overhang, the nding that liquidity is not a determining factor for farmers investment
behaviour is not surprising. Within the period reviewed both the security of income through
the EU farm payments scheme as well as the availability of credit - with their high net worth
as collateral - would have allowed farmers easy access to external debt.
104.3 O-farm income and investment
The nal nancing friction we consider is the role played by o-farm income and o-farm
employment in driving on-farm investment. We include a dummy for whether a farm operator
has an o-farm job. There is no impact of the o-farm dummy on investment using any of
the OLS, IV and SCLS methods. Farmers with o-farm employment are not systematically
investing more than those with no o-farm jobs. We also nd that o-farm employment is
not a driver of on-farm investment for any of the three age categories and size categories
considered.
The results of the interaction between o-farm income and both debt overhang and liquid-
ity are also considered. Interacting o-farm employment and debt does not seem to support
the hypothesis that o-farm employment eases credit constraints for investment. While both
the o farm employment dummy and the debt overhang level eect are not signicant individ-
ually, their interaction is signicant and negative. It suggests that farmers that have o-farm
employment are more constrained by access to nance than those that do not have o-farm
jobs. There are a number of possible explanations. First, it may be that those farmers that
have o-farm jobs have small farms thus would not have as much access to collateral to secure
loans. Alternatively, farmers with high levels of on-farm debt might have obtained o-farm
jobs to try and ease debt burdens.
Considering the interaction of o-farm employment with liquidity, no signicant impact
is found. Our results suggest that farmers with o-farm jobs are not dependent on internal
funds to drive investment and are not directly using o-farm income to add to internal funds
to pay investment expenditures.
4.4 Financial operating environment and investment
The overall nancial and macro operating environment and general credit availability are
both very much cyclical in nature, following the general business cycle as well as being driven
by nancial innovation. In this section, we test whether nancing frictions had a dierent
impact on farmer investment behaviour for the pre-crisis Irish euro membership period as well
as the nancial crisis itself. To assess whether the impact of nancing constraints diered
with the overall credit environment, we use a structural break approach, dening dummies
for pre crisis euro period as years 2002-2007 and the nancial crisis for the years 2008 and
112009. The results for the interactions with debt overhang are include in Table 1.
Table 1: First Dierence Regression Results
OLS IV SCLS OLS IV SCLS
Q (DO) -0.110 -0.913 -0.900 -0.097 -0.908 0.217
(0.089) (0.598) (0.730) (0.092) (0.604) (0.648)
Debt overhang -0.129*** -0.072 -0.074 -0.162*** -0.136 -0.164
(0.042) (0.070) (0.079) (0.056) (0.088) (0.070)
Financial crisis 0.005 -0.001 -0.020
(0.003) (0.006) (0.012)
DO  FC -0.320*** -0.290** -0.288**
(0.105) (0.114) (0.118)
Pre Crisis Euro Membership -0.007** 0.007** -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007)
DO  Euro 0.000 0.051 -0.019
(0.082) (0.115) (0.103)
System and Time Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
n 9,433 6,171 6,171 9,433 6,171 6,171
Cells show coecients and standard errors
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
There is no evidence of debt overhang impacting investment prior to the nancial crisis as
indicated by the insignicant coecient on the debt overhang variable using the IV and SCLS
methodologies. However the ndings indicate a signicant and negative role of debt overhang
on investment following the nancial crisis. Given that the nancial operating environment
since 2008 has been, and continues to be extremely challenging, the results would indicate that
access to additional credit was a signicant impediment to investment for leveraged farmers
since the nancial crisis. This is an important nding given that the nancial climate will
remain challenging going forward.
Considering the pre-crisis euro membership period, the results indicate that debt over-
hang was not an impediment to investment in this period as indicated by the insignicant
12coecients for all econometric methodologies. This is no surpise due to the wider credit en-
vironment at this time. We now consider the impact of liquidity in each of these two periods.
The results are presented in Table 2.
Table 2: First Dierence Regression Results
OLS IV SCLS OLS IV SCLS
Q -0.115 -0.784 -.783 -0.111 -0.767 -0.767
(0.092) (0.581) (0.667) (0.092) (0.583) (0.681)
r
CF -0.013 0.023 0.023 -0.047*** -0.030 -0.030
(0.009) (0.019) (0.020) (0.013) (0.023) (0.024)
Financial crisis 0.010*** 0.012*** -0.011
(0.003) (0.003) (0.013)
r
CF  FC -0.114*** -0.156*** -0.156***
(0.032) (0.040) (0.039)
Pre Crisis Euro Membership -0.000 -0.011** 0.008
(0.003) (0.005) (0.008)
r
CF  Euro 0.050*** 0.060*** 0.059***
(0.016) (0.023) (0.022)
System and Time Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
n 8,764 5,773 5,773 8,764 5,773 5,773
Cells show coecients and standard errors
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
13While the results indicate liquidity is not signicant over the whole sample, the interaction
of liquidity with the nancial crisis is signicant and negative at the 99 percent level using
the IV and SCLS methods. This indicates that since the nancial crisis farmers now depend
on their internal funds in making investment decisions.
The overall results from our assessment of the impact of the wider credit environment
on the role played by nancing frictions on investment indicates that in the pre-crisis euro
membership period, credit constraints did not bind for farmers and there was no impact of
debt overhang or liquidity on investment. However for the period since the onset of the
nancial crisis, debt overhang is signicant and negatively related to investment and liquidity
is positively related to investment. These results are in line with Bierlen and Featherstone
(1998) who found that credit constraints varied with business and credit cycles.
5 Conclusion
A number of overall conclusions emerge from our research. Firstly, there is no evidence that
fundamentals drive investment for Irish farmers. The empirical proxy for the Q statistic that
is included in the analysis is statistically insignicant when the SCLS approach is used for all
models. An explanation for this negative sign relates to the reaction of farmers to the declining
returns to agriculture in recent years. As farmers may be reluctant to leave a declining
industry or consolidate to drive scale economies, on observing declining fundamentals, they
may be attempting to invest as a way to enhance future protability. It is also highly likely
that some of this relationship can be explained by the requirement of farmers to undertake
compliance based investment for environmental reasons.
In relation to nancing frictions, there is some limited evidence that debt overhang, when
considered on its own, has a negative impact on investment. The result is strongest for
middle-aged farmers but the impact of debt overhang does not change depending on the size
of the farm. We nd no impact of liquidity on investment overall in the data. Farmers
are not dependent on internal funds to drive investment expenditure over the whole sample.
There are a number of potential explanations as to why farmers were not subject to credit
constraints over the period evaluated. Both their relatively high net worth from land holdings
and the wider credit environment would have provided signicant access to external capital.
Additionally, the security of income provided under the EU CAP support system may have
14been viewed as relatively low risk and secure by lenders when evaluating loan applications.
Our nding supports the work of Sckokai and Moro (2009) and Lagerkvist (2005).
With regard to o-farm income and employment, we found no evidence of the direct
impact whereby o-farm income supplements internal funds that are used to cover investment
expenditure. This result holds with regard to the age of the farm operator and the size of the
farm. Neither the dummy for o-farm employment nor its interactions with liquidity yields
a signicant result. There is no indication that farmers are substituting o-farm capital for
on-farm labour. There is also no evidence found in regard to the indirect channel whereby
o-farm employment eases credit constraints by inuencing the decision of lenders to take
o-farm employment into account when making loan decisions.
The impact of the credit cycle on whether credit constraints are binding is also evaluated.
The ndings indicate that in the pre-crisis period following Ireland adopting the euro currency,
credit constraints did not bind and neither debt overhang or liquidity impacted investment.
As this was a period in which credit was abundantly available in the overall economy, as
Irish banks accessed international and euro credit markets with relative ease, it is no surprise
that farmers, who have access to signicant collateral due to their land holdings, and secure
subsidies under CAP, were not credit constrained. However, since the onset of the nancial
crisis, both debt overhang and liquidity have become signicant determinants of investment.
Debt overhang is found to be a signicant and negative determinant of investment following
the crisis while liquidity is found to have a positive impact on investment since the crisis.
This indicates that farmers are now dependent on their internal funds to drive investment.
These are important ndings for the sector and, if agriculture is to develop through business
investment, access to credit issues will need to be addressed going forward.
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